This paper looks at the impacts of handing over the Tsovani irrigation scheme from the parastatal authority ARDA to community management. It examines how this has worked and for whom.
The study finds that the Tsovani case provides evidence of unequal access to water, incomes, and social and political networks; these processes run against the idea that the transfer of a state asset benefits all the people concerned. The paper analyses the networks used by three identified groups in accessing water, as well as wider economic and political institutions, and how this reinforces social differentiation in Tsovani.
Main findings include:
- differential access to water and other household assets by plot holders in the scheme is contributing to the emergence of three main social groups: ‘gold-class’; middle; and poor irrigators
- only the relatively well off, with access to alternative cash incomes and good social and political networks are able to become commercial irrigators
- high costs, notably of pump electricity and maintenance, have resulted in the poorer farmers failing to fully utilise their irrigable pieces of land
- poor irrigators have not been able to cope with increases in contributions to pool money required to pay electricity bills. In addition, they are not able to secure loans from financial institutions because they are considered as high risk
- a recent attempt at redistributing irrigated land and water access by war veterans has resulted in shifts in political control in the scheme, but not necessarily economic benefits
- new scheme members, without the necessary capital and assets, find themselves in the same position as existing poorer scheme members, unable to reap the benefits of irrigation infrastructure
[Adapted from author]